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Minutus • The argument from particulars [was: provings]
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The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 2:22 am
by John Harvey
Vera,
I think you're right on the mark, clarifying much. Where I'd respectfully disagree with you (respectfully since you seek to represent homoeopathy accurately) is in the interpretation (in your first few lines) that prescription upon the law of similars was the way that Hahnemann found in which to harness the laws of nature that you say are "around" the law of similars.
There was no such process.
Hahnemann did not rediscover any "general" law of nature that could be described as a general or universal law of similars whose particular application is homoeopathy. Nothing could be further from his express thoughts on this even in the Organon, where he chided those who ran with speculative fantasies from the observable into the unseen and unobserbable. (When you think about it, Hahnemann was an incredibly pioneering scientist in his insistence alone that explanations should be confined to the observable.)
One easy example of Hahnemann's self-discipline in this matter is the harsh criticism he reserved for the epitome of the universal "law of similars", the allopathic doctrine of signatures. This stated that the appropriate medicinal uses of plants and substances was indicated in their appearance and other signs.
The fact is that Hahnemann discovered no law but a single fact: that Peruvian bark causes symptoms resembling those of malaria.
He spent about four years researching other substances and their relationship to the symptoms and illnesses they were known to have cured and accumulating many more single facts, all demonstrating the same relationship of curative potential to pathogenetic potential. And only after that did he, by induction, conclude that this relationship of similars appears to be one general to medicines.
So the general "law" that we call the law of similars is not a specific example of a universal law as Irene contends; and its practice in homoeopathy is not a way of implementing any such universal law. The law of similars is rather the generalisation of the particular discoveries that have been made using particular single, simple medicines both in crude form and in low and high potency.
That being so, it is misleading to consider the practice of homoeopathy -- in which one prescribes medicine upon the basis of this generalised medical observation that, for convenience, we call a law -- as something that he might have experimented beyond if only he had lived long enough to do so. The method, not being a particular method of implementing a imaginary universal law, is not in a position to be replaced by some other method of implementing the same imaginary law. It is instead merely the way of using to good effect the general "law" that sums up the many, many particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship. As such, it is -- self-evidently -- irreplaceable as the means of prescribing upon the basis of that relationship.
Irene's argument from universal law seeks to forget the particular observations, to jump instead to this imaginary universal law, misrepresent homoeopathy (prescribing upon patient symptom similarity to pathogenesis) as one arbitrary method of implementing the imaginary law, and argue that there are many other ways of implementing it.
My argument is that Hahnemann's definition of homoeopathy cuts through all speculation, to the heart of his discoveries: that in knowing the ways in which a particular substance deranges health and knowing the ways in which a patient's health has been deranged, and only in knowing them, you can gauge that substance's homoeopathicity to the patient relative to that of another substance.
The homoeopathic method -- the only homoeopathic method, however one implements it -- is to make that assessment of one substance's homoeopathicity to the patient in relation the next one's, until one is satisfied that a particular substance shows the greatest homoeopathicity.
Then, and only then, is one in a position to make a prescription homoeopathically.
If anyone can express more clearly this growth of the method from the particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship rather than from presumptions of universal laws, I'd welcome the input.
Cheers --
John
2009/7/2 Vera Resnick >
--
------------------------------------------------------------------

"Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose that our views of science are ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete; and that there are no new worlds to conquer."

— Sir Humphry Davy, in "An Account of some Galvanic Combinations", Philosophical Transactions 91 (1801), pp. 397–402 (as quoted by David Knight, Humphry Davy: Science and Power, Cambridge, 1998, p. 87)

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 7:02 am
by Irene de Villiers
Have the courtesy not to misquote me. I don't know your mechanism for
these inventions.
Stick to YOUR views, and do not misrepresent mine as here.

......Irene
--
Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom/D.Vet.Hom.
P.O. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.
www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)
"Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it."

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 7:55 am
by John Harvey
Hmm. So, before you're prepared to respond, I must find a way to incorporate into the sentence

"Irene's argument from universal law seeks to forget the particular observations, to jump instead to this imaginary universal law, misrepresent homoeopathy (prescribing upon patient symptom similarity to pathogenesis) as one arbitrary method of implementing the imaginary law, and argue that there are many other ways of implementing it"

everything I'm summing up, or else quote you at length and then sum up.

Don't you think you've quoted yourself at enough length to serve this purpose? Ah, well.

Here's a sample of what I'm discussing there. These are your words, with my emphasis:
'It is intentional on my part that my definition specifies *principles* and does not limit *implementation* to the things done by Hahnemann with these principles. This allows expansion of homeopathy to keep up with the times BUT only as far as anything new (like a new remedy or a new potency series) still fits the PRINCIPLES set out by Hahnemann, and most especially the principle from nature involving the Law of Similars - without which nothing can be called "homeopathic".'
Now, let's shortcut this a little: why don't you tell us exactly what you understand by "the Law of Similars", as the phrase quite obviously means something quite special to you. Once you've committed yourself to a meaning, then we'll be able to discuss it without your continual denial that you said anything. If in fact you don't subscribe to what you appear to be subscribing to above, then I'll withdraw the entire sentence -- the entire paragraph, in fact. :-)
Thanks!
John
2009/7/2 Irene de Villiers >

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 8:03 am
by Vera Resnick
John,

I wrote in shorthand. Let me explain how I see the process - I actually think it is starting in the wrong place to start the definition of homeopathy with the law of similars.

1. In the Organon Hahnemann points out that two similar diseases cannot exist in the organism at the same time. The stronger destroys the weaker. This is what I see as the cornerstone of homeopathy - this is law, unchanging.
2. The problem faced is that the stronger natural disease may destroy the patient alongside the weaker natural disease, as this stronger natural disease cannot be controlled.
3. Remedies that can create a stronger, similar, artificial, disease are usually toxic and dangerous.
4. Through dilution, succussion, and especially using water dosing methods we can create a stronger similar artificial disease that can be controlled and fine-tuned.
5. Through his experimentation, provings, and work throughout the years, Hahnemann harnessed the power contained in often toxic substances to enable their use for the purpose of cure by creating stronger, similar, artificial diseases in the organism.
6. A remedy given homeopathically is a remedy given in a way that follows this progression.

From there the issue branches out in many directions. How to define a natural disease, how to define an artificial disease etc. But I feel the law of similars is very much a blanket term that doesn't have full content or context without looking at the cornerstone that starts this progression.

Vera

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 8:34 am
by John Harvey
Hi, Vera --

A good reply and pertinent points of history, and I understand, I think, what you're saying, if not quite how you see its affecting the definition of homoeopathy.

But let me point out something.

Hahnemann's exploration of the history of medicine, even leaving aside his twelve years or so in studying the chronic diseases, is something that he did in the process of exploring what principle or principles had been used, advertently or not, in curing patients in the past. And he made that exploration because he had discovered many particular examples, through experimentation, of the relationship of similarity between pathogenesis and cured patient's symptoms.

It added to his arsenal, certainly. It was perfect enlightenment of his understanding that the same principle applies amongst natural diseases as does between a medicine and a natural disease. He even discussed the practicability (or rather impracticability) of applying one disease to cure another. But he in no measure recommended actually using it as a method of curing people, and did not suggest that the responsible practitioner, the practitioner who knows her medicines and her patients' symptoms, employ a disease in curing the patient.

In saying that, I'm not opposing that practice; just being careful to exclude it from the practice of medicine that he named homoeopathy.

The experimentation that you've placed second-last on your list was not done in any effort to confirm a hypothesis or impression of natural or universal law beyond his rolling hypothesis that pathogenesis must be similar to patient in order to effect a cure. His research into medical history eliminated any certain contradictors of that hypothesis. What his experiments did, though, was to test it first and give him a reasonably sound basis for inductively concluding what we call, in our shorthand, the law of similars, Similia similibus curantur (that cure occurs through the application of like to like). From that conclusion, it was a very short step to the recommendation Similia similibus curentur (that one should cure through the application of like to like).

So it was observation of particular suppressions and particular cures in history and particular cures in experimentation that led to the general observation. The general observation and the hypothesis it generated led to the accidental discovery that natural illnesses with the same relationships (as medicines to natural illnesses) had the same effects. Further clinical work supported the hypothesis, which with sufficient support became a law. The disquieting observation that patients suffered significantly from their moderate doses of homoeopathic medicine led to the experiments in reducing dosage that led to the discovery of the phenomenon of potency.

It's on this basis that it's possible to state with certainty that Hahnemann did not derive the law of similars from some broader observation of relationships of similars of all kinds; that he derived it (in both the indicative form, curantur, and the imperative one, curentur) directly from the examples he saw of medicines' strange capability of curing those illnesses resembling their pathogenesis.

Cheers!

John
2009/7/2 Vera Resnick >

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 8:54 am
by Irene de Villiers
< - I actually think it is starting in the wrong place to start the
definition of homeopathy with the law of similars

and
.

Dear Vera - This IS the Law of SImilars - and it seems you place it
as number one after all?
Do you not see it as being at the core of homeopathy?

Did I miss something?

Do you see the Law of Similars as something else?

Namaste,
Irene
--
Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom/D.Vet.Hom.
P.O. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.
www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)
"Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it."

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 8:59 am
by John Harvey
Ah. So will that serve as your answer to my question, Irene? That the Law of Similars is, to you, "that two similar diseases cannot exist in the organism at the same time. The stronger destroys the weaker"?

Or would you like to express it in some other way?
Thanks --

John
2009/7/2 Irene de Villiers >

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 3:55 pm
by Shannon Nelson
Yes, that's my memory and understanding too.
I think that is "law of similars" indeed--*although* the examples I
cited from Intro. to Organon indicate clearly (very clearly) that he
*also* used the word homeopathy, and the connection to "cure by
similars", with reference to non-medicinal methods, not only for cure
by remedy!
Shannon

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 4:08 pm
by John Harvey
Yeah, and that's fine, Shannon, but did he set up a system of everything, or a system of medicine?
2009/7/2 Shannon & Bob Nelson >
--
------------------------------------------------------------------

"Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose that our views of science are ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete; and that there are no new worlds to conquer."

— Sir Humphry Davy, in "An Account of some Galvanic Combinations", Philosophical Transactions 91 (1801), pp. 397–402 (as quoted by David Knight, Humphry Davy: Science and Power, Cambridge, 1998, p. 87)

Re: The argument from particulars [was: provings]

Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 4:19 pm
by Shannon Nelson
One could say he set up a system whereby one can use "everything" for
medicine, not only potentized substances.

Why is that bad?

I trust you don't deny that he *did* use "homeopathy" and "homeopathic"
to refer to these things? Then why do you want to exclude them from
the definition? It is "like cures like." and I can't see what's
"non-Hahnemannian" about using the word in the way that he used it?