The argument from particulars [was: provings]
Posted: Thu Jul 02, 2009 2:22 am
Vera,
I think you're right on the mark, clarifying much. Where I'd respectfully disagree with you (respectfully since you seek to represent homoeopathy accurately) is in the interpretation (in your first few lines) that prescription upon the law of similars was the way that Hahnemann found in which to harness the laws of nature that you say are "around" the law of similars.
There was no such process.
Hahnemann did not rediscover any "general" law of nature that could be described as a general or universal law of similars whose particular application is homoeopathy. Nothing could be further from his express thoughts on this even in the Organon, where he chided those who ran with speculative fantasies from the observable into the unseen and unobserbable. (When you think about it, Hahnemann was an incredibly pioneering scientist in his insistence alone that explanations should be confined to the observable.)
One easy example of Hahnemann's self-discipline in this matter is the harsh criticism he reserved for the epitome of the universal "law of similars", the allopathic doctrine of signatures. This stated that the appropriate medicinal uses of plants and substances was indicated in their appearance and other signs.
The fact is that Hahnemann discovered no law but a single fact: that Peruvian bark causes symptoms resembling those of malaria.
He spent about four years researching other substances and their relationship to the symptoms and illnesses they were known to have cured and accumulating many more single facts, all demonstrating the same relationship of curative potential to pathogenetic potential. And only after that did he, by induction, conclude that this relationship of similars appears to be one general to medicines.
So the general "law" that we call the law of similars is not a specific example of a universal law as Irene contends; and its practice in homoeopathy is not a way of implementing any such universal law. The law of similars is rather the generalisation of the particular discoveries that have been made using particular single, simple medicines both in crude form and in low and high potency.
That being so, it is misleading to consider the practice of homoeopathy -- in which one prescribes medicine upon the basis of this generalised medical observation that, for convenience, we call a law -- as something that he might have experimented beyond if only he had lived long enough to do so. The method, not being a particular method of implementing a imaginary universal law, is not in a position to be replaced by some other method of implementing the same imaginary law. It is instead merely the way of using to good effect the general "law" that sums up the many, many particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship. As such, it is -- self-evidently -- irreplaceable as the means of prescribing upon the basis of that relationship.
Irene's argument from universal law seeks to forget the particular observations, to jump instead to this imaginary universal law, misrepresent homoeopathy (prescribing upon patient symptom similarity to pathogenesis) as one arbitrary method of implementing the imaginary law, and argue that there are many other ways of implementing it.
My argument is that Hahnemann's definition of homoeopathy cuts through all speculation, to the heart of his discoveries: that in knowing the ways in which a particular substance deranges health and knowing the ways in which a patient's health has been deranged, and only in knowing them, you can gauge that substance's homoeopathicity to the patient relative to that of another substance.
The homoeopathic method -- the only homoeopathic method, however one implements it -- is to make that assessment of one substance's homoeopathicity to the patient in relation the next one's, until one is satisfied that a particular substance shows the greatest homoeopathicity.
Then, and only then, is one in a position to make a prescription homoeopathically.
If anyone can express more clearly this growth of the method from the particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship rather than from presumptions of universal laws, I'd welcome the input.
Cheers --
John
2009/7/2 Vera Resnick >
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"Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose that our views of science are ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete; and that there are no new worlds to conquer."
— Sir Humphry Davy, in "An Account of some Galvanic Combinations", Philosophical Transactions 91 (1801), pp. 397–402 (as quoted by David Knight, Humphry Davy: Science and Power, Cambridge, 1998, p. 87)
I think you're right on the mark, clarifying much. Where I'd respectfully disagree with you (respectfully since you seek to represent homoeopathy accurately) is in the interpretation (in your first few lines) that prescription upon the law of similars was the way that Hahnemann found in which to harness the laws of nature that you say are "around" the law of similars.
There was no such process.
Hahnemann did not rediscover any "general" law of nature that could be described as a general or universal law of similars whose particular application is homoeopathy. Nothing could be further from his express thoughts on this even in the Organon, where he chided those who ran with speculative fantasies from the observable into the unseen and unobserbable. (When you think about it, Hahnemann was an incredibly pioneering scientist in his insistence alone that explanations should be confined to the observable.)
One easy example of Hahnemann's self-discipline in this matter is the harsh criticism he reserved for the epitome of the universal "law of similars", the allopathic doctrine of signatures. This stated that the appropriate medicinal uses of plants and substances was indicated in their appearance and other signs.
The fact is that Hahnemann discovered no law but a single fact: that Peruvian bark causes symptoms resembling those of malaria.
He spent about four years researching other substances and their relationship to the symptoms and illnesses they were known to have cured and accumulating many more single facts, all demonstrating the same relationship of curative potential to pathogenetic potential. And only after that did he, by induction, conclude that this relationship of similars appears to be one general to medicines.
So the general "law" that we call the law of similars is not a specific example of a universal law as Irene contends; and its practice in homoeopathy is not a way of implementing any such universal law. The law of similars is rather the generalisation of the particular discoveries that have been made using particular single, simple medicines both in crude form and in low and high potency.
That being so, it is misleading to consider the practice of homoeopathy -- in which one prescribes medicine upon the basis of this generalised medical observation that, for convenience, we call a law -- as something that he might have experimented beyond if only he had lived long enough to do so. The method, not being a particular method of implementing a imaginary universal law, is not in a position to be replaced by some other method of implementing the same imaginary law. It is instead merely the way of using to good effect the general "law" that sums up the many, many particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship. As such, it is -- self-evidently -- irreplaceable as the means of prescribing upon the basis of that relationship.
Irene's argument from universal law seeks to forget the particular observations, to jump instead to this imaginary universal law, misrepresent homoeopathy (prescribing upon patient symptom similarity to pathogenesis) as one arbitrary method of implementing the imaginary law, and argue that there are many other ways of implementing it.
My argument is that Hahnemann's definition of homoeopathy cuts through all speculation, to the heart of his discoveries: that in knowing the ways in which a particular substance deranges health and knowing the ways in which a patient's health has been deranged, and only in knowing them, you can gauge that substance's homoeopathicity to the patient relative to that of another substance.
The homoeopathic method -- the only homoeopathic method, however one implements it -- is to make that assessment of one substance's homoeopathicity to the patient in relation the next one's, until one is satisfied that a particular substance shows the greatest homoeopathicity.
Then, and only then, is one in a position to make a prescription homoeopathically.
If anyone can express more clearly this growth of the method from the particular observations of the homoeopathic relationship rather than from presumptions of universal laws, I'd welcome the input.
Cheers --
John
2009/7/2 Vera Resnick >
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
"Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose that our views of science are ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete; and that there are no new worlds to conquer."
— Sir Humphry Davy, in "An Account of some Galvanic Combinations", Philosophical Transactions 91 (1801), pp. 397–402 (as quoted by David Knight, Humphry Davy: Science and Power, Cambridge, 1998, p. 87)